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**EXHIBIT 10** 

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EXHIBIT 10

**APPEARANCES** 1 2 3 FOR THE PETITIONER: DAVID B. STARKS McKinley Irvin PLLC 1501 4th Avenue 4 5 Suite 1750 Seattle, WA 98101 6 7 FOR THE RESPONDENT: KATELYN D. SKINNER Buckley Law PC 5300 Meadows Road 8 9 Suite 200 Lake Oswego, OR 97035-8617 10 11 12 13 14 15 Kendra A. Steppler, RPR, CRR 16 COURT REPORTER: United States District Courthouse District of Oregon 17 405 E. 8th Avenue, Room 2100 Eugene, OR 97401 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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## \*\*\*EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS\*\*\*

THE COURT: Can we start with wrongful removal?

Because I'm still not hearing you talk about --

MS. SKINNER: The -- our arguments --

THE COURT: -- the underlying agreement --

MS. SKINNER: The --

THE COURT: -- by which the children left for the United States. And, I agree, there are some credibility issues with some of the explanations that don't make a lot of sense by Mr. Paris. But, I'll be honest, I'm not sure if the explanation that your client gave about Exhibit 23 is particularly credible. I know she kept saying it's made out of context. But I've yet to see what other context there is, especially in light of the fact that on October 7th, she filed a petition totally revoking any interest in the July 19th agreement.

MS. SKINNER: Thank you, Your Honor. And I'll address both points. As to the intent of Ms. Brown at the time she entered into the July agreement, I think she testified, credibly, that she negotiated that agreement for hours and hours. There was discussions back and fork about health insurance and all of the conditions that were placed. She had already started to do the work to put those things --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. SKINNER: -- in motion. And if she had had a plan to not follow through with the July agreement, then why would she get her French visa renewed in September of 2022, or take the steps to get it renewed?

THE COURT: But what she told me is that she wanted to leave her options open, which tells me that she believed she had the unilateral ability to simply keep the children in the United States. And she certainly has -- is attempting to do that by the October 7th filing.

MS. SKINNER: And I'll address the October 7th filing in just a moment with the testimony about keeping options open. I think we need to look at that in light of the flip-flopping that Mr. Paris had done at that point. And I think her credible testimony was, in discussions with her lawyer, it was what do I do if he reneges on this again? What can I do? What -- could a plan be put into place if that happens? I need something with security.

And what we don't have in evidence is any evidence that show that she took -- and I'll get to the October 7th custody pleading in just a moment -- so that aside, she took no steps to renege on the July agreement. And, in fact, the opposite is true. She took all of the steps to keep that agreement upheld and in place.

There's no evidence to show that there was an appointment scheduled with an Oregon lawyer for July 29th, plus six months,

so that she could go in there and get the petition filed.

There was no petition for custody that was drafted up and ready to go so that on six months and a day, that that could be done.

Because she didn't take any steps to breach the agreement.

Now, why did she file Exhibit 49, the custody case in Oregon? Not because that was part of her preplan, because, in fact, the six months obviously hadn't expired at that point. She did that because Dad had filed in France, on October 3rd, a French custody case. And Ms. Brown was concerned that, again, it was another reneging of a contract, and that Mr. Paris was going to use the October 3rd French custody filing to again yank the kids back.

And so the October 7th, 2022, filing had nothing to do with I'm trying to now get UCCJDA jurisdiction. It had everything to do with simply getting a status quo in place so that the terms of the July agreement would be able to continue in force. Because with the status quo, the kids are here for the time being, in line with that one-year agreement.

Now, Mr. Paris' counsel had much to say about Mr. Paris' illness. But I haven't heard any testimony or received -- I didn't receive one piece of evidence brought into this court about a single condition, symptom, or any impact that it had on Mr. Paris' daily living, except that he takes some B12 vitamins and goes and sees a doctor occasionally.

But, more importantly, the information about his disease

was known to him at the time of the July agreement, which was why all of those conditions were built into the July agreement, which was why Ms. Brown went to all of the lengths that she did to ensure that Mr. Paris' medical condition would be adequately met in the U.S.

Mr. Paris indicates, in his closing argument, again, that this is not a best interest determination in the court to date. We know that. The state court level will determine what's in the kids' best interest. He brought up a reference to Exhibit 27, wherein Ms. Brown was indicating to Mr. Paris that the kids were concerned for their dad. They were afraid he was going to die. And that's because that's what he told them. He was manipulating them and said, "Your dad is going to die."

And so he's bringing his kids into the case. And we have evidence of that from just earlier this morning, where Mr. Paris is messaging with Ms. Brown, just recently, saying, you know, "I'm" -- basically -- "I'm telling the kids that we're moving to Paris at the end of this court case. So you better get your act in gear." And so we have evidence that he's been bringing the kids into these inappropriate communications.

Now, Mr. Paris argues, and his counsel argues in closing argument, that he didn't consent to enrollment in Oregon school. But he sure consented to unenrollment in French school well before even the July agreement. That was something that

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they then remained unenrolled in the French system until much, much later, when he attempted to reenroll the children there.

Now, he's indicating that he is not, quote, "on the lease to the Oregon property." But he's an authorized resident of that lease. He has the right to -- and that's how that was set He also agreed to put the -- one of their children's four-year musical program on hold for a year. That was done. And so steps were taken to ensure that the parties' move for one year was put into motion.

And the one-year pause on the program, of course, was also agreed to by Ms. Brown. She didn't say that the children need to be removed from school altogether and taken out of that program. She went along and agreed, equally, with the proposal that the children's schooling in France would be put on hold, and that that program would be reserved for them.

Now, there's one other case that I'd like to bring to the Court's attention if this Court finds that the facts fit this And that's the idea of whether or not Mr. Paris is situation. bringing this action prematurely having to do with the question about anticipatory breach. And that is the Toren v. Toren case, cited also in my briefing, 191 F.3d 23 --

> THE COURT: Right.

MS. SKINNER: -- which talks about a father who was petitioning to a claim that the mother had made an intent to retain the children past their agreement. But that date had

not been reached yet. And the court held there that father's argument was based on mother's future intent, and that the father was seeking a judicial remedy for an anticipatory violation of the Hague Convention. But the Hague Convention only provides a cause of action to petitioners who can establish actual retention. And so that was merely anticipatory retention.

We've got the same facts here if the Court finds that

Ms. -- even if the Court does find that Ms. Brown has made an
anticipatory retention, which we argue she hasn't -- no steps
were taken -- the October 7th Oregon custody petition was for a
separate reason, again, to protect and preserve the July
agreement to keep the children here.

And so this -- and then I also want to touch, just briefly, on habitual residence. Because I think that -- depending upon if the Court finds there was a wrongful removal or retention, that does not begin and end our discussion about habitual residency being in France. Because if the Court finds, for example, that there was a wrongful removal or retention, and if the Court sets the date of October 7th, for example, I think there's still a pretty strong argument that, on October 7th, the facts under a Monasky analysis show that Oregon was, in fact, the children's habitual residence at that time, because France had been abandoned. And the evidence shows that the children pretty quickly assimilated into their

surroundings here in Oregon.

And so, in closing, Your Honor, we argue that there was no wrongful removal or retention. If there was, we argue the defense of consent. And if the Court finds that the defense of consent is satisfied, that's the end of the discussion.

There's no more habitual residence argument. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Reply?

(Excerpt of proceedings concluded at 3:02 PM.)

CERTIFICATE

Arnaud Paris v. Heidi Marie Brown
Case No. 1:22-cv-01593-MC
Court Trial Excerpt

December 7, 2022

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I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a true and correct excerpt of the record, taken by stenographic means, of the proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature, conformed signature, or digitally signed signature is not certified.

/s/Kendra A. Steppler, RPR, CRR
Official Court Reporter Signature Date: July 31, 2023